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1. Introduction
We discuss two models of virtue cultivation that are present throughout the 
Republic: the self-mastery model and the harmony model.  Schultz (2013) 
discusses them at length in her recent book, Plato’s Socrates as Narrator: 
A Philosophical Muse.  We bring this Socratic distinction into conversa-
tion with two modes of intentional regulational strategies articulated by 
James J. Gross.  These strategies are expressive suppression and cognitive 
reappraisal.  We argue that that the Socratic distinction helps us see the 
value in cognitive reappraisal and that the contemporary neurological re-
search supports the wide range of attitudes toward the value of emotional 
experience that mirror those found in the Republic.
First, we outline the self-mastery and the harmony model.  Second, 
we discuss Gross’s two models and suggest how the Socratic models map 
very nicely onto them.  We argue that Socrates’ insight about the instability 
of the self-mastery model buttressed by contemporary empirical research 
confi rms that we ought to prefer the cognitive reappraisal model because 
of the authenticity and integrity displayed in those who practice it.  Finally, 
we argue that contemporary research upholds Plato’s nuanced understand-
ing of self-comportment.  This provides an alternative interpretation to the 
traditional view of virtue cultivation in the Republic which calls Socratic 
intellectualism into question.  Moreover, we argue that—contrary to the 
traditional view—Plato articulates a positive role for the emotions that is 
reinforced by contemporary empirical research.
2. The Self-Mastery Model and the Harmony Model 
In this section, we discuss a provocative argument from the recent book, 
Plato’s Socrates as Narrator.  In the chapter on the Republic Schultz ar-
gues against the intellectualist view of Socrates in part by demonstrating 
that there are two models of self-comportment at work in the Republic. 
Here we will summarize her fi ndings.  According to Schultz, the tradi-
tional interpretation of self-comportment—the self-mastery model—ac-
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cords well with Socratic intellectualism, which “seems to identify virtue 
with knowledge and therefore appears to consider the affective side of our 
nature irrelevant to our virtue, to what counts as a good life.” (Nehamas, 
1992, p. 280).  The self-mastery model of virtue requires that the logistikon 
(the rational part of the soul), rule over the epithumetikon (the appetitive 
part) with the help of the thumetikon (the spirited part).  In this model, the 
appetites and emotions hinder our ability to be virtuous.  The logistikon 
must therefore master these strong infl uences and work to diminish them 
as much as possible.  This model depends upon the tripartite conception 
of the soul found in Book IV of the Republic.  Though Socrates qualifi es 
his confi dence in their ability to “get a precise grasp of it on the basis of 
procedures such as we’re now using in argument” (435d), nonetheless, he 
proceeds with his analysis (437b).  Socrates fi rst discusses the epithume-
tikon, the lowest part of the soul.  Its scope is “being thirsty and hungry, 
and generally the desires, and further, willing and wanting” (437b).  It is 
the seat of our appetites, desires, and the emotions associated with satisfy-
ing our appetites and desires.  Appetites, desires and emotions are differ-
ent mental states with different directions of fi t, so it might seem odd that 
Socrates lumps them together.  However, what they have in common is 
that they all tend to be more automatic actions rather than conscious, de-
liberate actions.  Furthermore, these more automatic processes can easily 
overwhelm the agent’s ability to control them. 
After Socrates describes the epithumetikon, he discusses the logis-
tikon.  This part of the soul is responsible for our ability to reason and 
refl ect.  It participates in all pursuits related to learning and acquiring 
knowledge.  It contemplates and philosophizes: the logistikon is the seat of 
the highest human activity.  Socrates initially presents the logistikon’s pur-
pose as largely negative and constraining.  Socrates asks Glaucon, “if ever 
something draws it [the epithumetikon] back when it’s thirsting, wouldn’t 
that be something different in it from that which thirsts and leads it like 
a beast to drink?” (439b).  Socrates asks again, “isn’t there something 
in their soul bidding them to drink and something forbidding them to do 
so, something different that masters that which bids?” (439c).  The third 
part of the soul contains spirit [thumos].  Thumos is that “with which we 
are spirited” (439c).  It produces ferocity and courage when properly bal-
anced, but can easily be drawn out of balance and contribute to cruel and 
harsh behaviors.  Given the constraints of this paper, we use the logistikon 
and epithumetikon as the modes of comparison to contemporary research. 
We feel justifi ed in this emphasis because Socrates expresses some doubt 
as to whether it is really a third distinct part of the soul.
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In sum, the self-mastery model prioritizes reason as the means by 
which we become good and dismisses the role the other parts of the soul 
can play in the process of becoming good.  Under this view, the appetites 
present distracting and, at times, even dangerous obstacles that we must 
overcome in our pursuit of justice in the soul.  Socrates allows for some 
positive therapeutic function for certain forms of poetry in early educa-
tion.  It seems there, at least, the proper formation of the lowest part does 
allow it to play some role in becoming good, or welcoming the good when 
one sees it (401d–402a).
Schultz argues that the self-mastery model is not the only model pres-
ent in the Republic: in fact, Socrates employs images of harmony to de-
scribe the nature of justice in both the city and the soul.  This view has vast 
implications for reading Plato and understanding his view of the emotions 
and virtue cultivation which she explores in Plato’s Socrates as Narrator. 
Here we focus on explicating the harmony model and demonstrating its 
affi nity with contemporary models of emotion regulation.  In the Republic, 
Socrates refutes Thrasymachus’ view that justice is nothing other than the 
interest of the stronger.  He remarks that justice produces “unanimity and 
friendship” amongst people (351d).  In a just city, people live in harmony 
with each other.  One faction of the population does not rule over another 
faction.  Another instance of the harmony model on the level of the city 
occurs after Socrates presents the image of the sun, the line, and the cave. 
Socrates explains how they will ensure the establishment of justice in the 
city by “compelling” those with the best natures to rule (519d).  Glaucon 
objects: “Are we to do them an injustice, and make them live a worse life 
when a better is possible for them?” (519e).  Socrates employs a harmony 
metaphor to address Glaucon’s concern.  They are concerned with “the 
city as a whole, harmoniously uniting citizens by persuasion and necessity, 
causing them to share with each other the benefi t each is able to bring to 
the commonwealth” (520a).  A just city functions according to the princi-
ples of harmony, not the principles of mastery.  Socrates uses metaphors of 
harmony to describe the structure of the cosmos as well (531d and 617b). 
A just soul mirrors the harmonious ordering of the cosmos.  Socrates also 
employs metaphors of disharmony when discussing injustice in the city. 
In his initial exchange with Thrasymachus, Socrates notes that injustice 
“produces factions, hatreds, and quarrels” (351d).  The citizens cannot 
live in harmony with each other.  They fi ght against each other instead of 
working for the good of the city together (547a).
The harmony model is distinct from the self-mastery model in several 
ways.  First, the harmony model allows the epithumetikon to have a voice. 
It provides necessary notes on the scale of internal justice (443d).  The har-
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mony model emphasizes the role of the appetites and the emotions in the 
well-ordered soul (441a).  To see how harmony comes about in the soul, 
consider the metaphor of a vocal ensemble.  A trio has a leader, a person 
that makes fi nal decisions about the composition of each piece.  However, 
in a well-composed trio all three voices are always in harmony, but the 
lead voice is not always singing melody.  Different members will take the 
melody at different points depending on what is appropriate for the piece. 
Analogously, in a well-ordered soul all three parts are always in harmony. 
However, like the trio, one part—the logistikon—makes the fi nal call on 
which part is emphasized at what time.  True harmony of soul requires that 
the logistikon incorporates the thumetikon and the epithumetikon.
3. Intentional Regulatory Strategies:
Expressive Suppression and Cognitive Reappraisal
Simply put, in these two models of self-comportment, Socrates articulates 
two versions of what is now called an intentional regulatory strategy.1  En-
gaging in intentional regulatory strategies (whether instantaneous or over 
extended periods of time) allows the individual to have different emotions 
and perform different actions.  Furthermore, these strategies change the 
neurological structure and activity in the brain.  There is a feedback loop 
involved in this process.  Intentional regulatory strategies change neu-
rological activity, and over time these changes can become permanent, 
allowing for the agent to more easily engage in the regulatory strategy. 
Research on the effects of meditation on the brain is particularly relevant 
here.
Recent studies in psychology and neurobiology support the view that 
human beings can intentionally infl uence both their mental states and their 
neurological activity.  Disentangling neurological activity from mental 
states is a philosophically vexing issue.  On the one hand, it seems (both 
philosophically and neurobiologically) that there cannot be a mental state 
that does not have a corresponding neural process.  However, some of the 
recent research points to a kind of agential metacognitive control over 
one’s neurological activity that is probably rooted in the prefrontal cortex, 
yet hard to identify empirically since the locus of activity can be in the 
amygdala and the PFC depending on what the agent is trying to accom-
plish (i.e. either suppress or allow an emotion).  The question is which 
area of the brain determines which area of the brain is in control?  This 
has led researchers such as Mario Beauregard, Jeffrey M. Schwartz and 
Gross to posit a metacognitive or executive mental feature that emerges 
out of neurological activity but is not fully reducible to it (Schwartz calls 
this “emergent materialism”).  Psychologist James J. Gross focuses on 
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different cognitive strategies that humans can engage in to infl uence what 
emotions they have, how they express them, and what behaviors follow 
those emotions.  Gross identifi es fi ve different points in the emotion gen-
eration sequence.  Four of these strategies are antecedent-focused—they 
take place before the emotion has been generated—and one is response-
focused—it takes place after the emotion is generated.  For the purposes of 
this paper, we focus on just two strategies, one antecedent-focused and one 
response-focused.  We argue that these two emotional regulation strategies 
map onto the two forms of Socratic self-comportment.
The response-focused regulation strategy is expressive suppression, 
which we believe has strong similarities to the Socratic self-mastery mod-
el.  Expressive suppression involves inhibiting ongoing emotion-expres-
sive behavior.  In this strategy, the agent “attempts to infl uence emotions 
response tendencies once they already have been elicited,” for instance, 
by attempting to suppress an emotional response that the agent is currently 
having (Gross, 2002, p. 283).  This strategy is utilized in situations where 
the agent is already experiencing an emotional response, and wishes to 
modulate that response ex post facto.  Gross and Mario Beauregard have 
conducted experiments that examine this strategy.  In one study, Gross had 
three groups view fi lm clips picked to elicit negative emotions in the sub-
jects.  One group was instructed to utilize a suppression strategy (response 
focused), the second group was instructed to utilize a reappraisal strategy 
(antecedent focused), and the control group was instructed simply to view 
the clip.  Gross concluded, “suppression (when compared to reappraisal 
and control groups) decreased the behavioral expression of negative emo-
tion but not the subjective experience” (2004, p. 1306).  The subjects still 
reported feeling sad, but did not display any behaviors typically associated 
with sadness.  Furthermore, agents who engaged in suppression strategies 
also “showed signs of greater physiological activation (in cardiovascular 
and electrodermal systems) than participants who simply watched” (2004, 
p. 1306).  In other words, suppression keeps the internal emotion from 
generating correlated behavior, but it does not keep the agent from experi-
encing the internal aspect of the emotion.  Gross notes that one of the main 
limitations of this experiment is the lack of a longitudinal element.  For 
instance, one might wonder if the affects would be different if the agent 
developed a habit of suppression where it becomes much easier to sup-
press over time.  Hopefully further research will shed some empirical light 
on this question.  Moreover, suppressing the emotion takes more effort 
and energy than reappraisal, making it the more taxing emotion regulation 
strategy over the long-term.
Another example of a suppression strategy is seen in a study conducted 
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by Beauregard et al. that performed fMRIs on men while watching erotic 
fi lm clips.  In the sexual arousal condition, they were told to react normally 
to these stimuli, not to suppress arousal.  In the suppression condition, they 
were told to “suppress any feelings elicited by the erotic fi lm excerpts” by 
becoming “a detached observer” (2007, p. 220).  This is a response-based 
modulation strategy because the agent cannot avoid the emotionally laden 
situation, and cannot stop the external stimulus from starting the emotion-
generation sequence.2  Once the emotion starts, the agent uses a cognitive 
strategy to view the situation from a different perspective and keep the 
emotion from generating “emotion-expressive behavior.”  The differences 
between the two conditions were not subtle.  Neurologically, the sexual 
arousal condition produced activity in mainly older parts of the brain (the 
limbic system and amygdala for instance) associated with automatic re-
sponses.  The suppression condition however activated cortical activity, 
parts of the brain associated with decision-making and conscious goal-
directed activity.  Beauregard and his colleagues concluded that this differ-
ence provides strong evidence for the view that “emotional self-regulation 
depends on a neural circuit in which the prefrontal cortical areas mediate 
the cognitive modulation of emotional responses generated at the subcorti-
cal level (2007, p. 220).  In other words, self-mastery is possible (at least 
momentarily) and changes brain activity.
The antecedent-focused regulation strategy is cognitive reappraisal, 
which we believe has strong similarities to the Socratic harmony model of 
self-comportment.  Gross describes the strategy of cognitive reappraisal 
as an “antecedent form of cognitive change that involves construing a po-
tentially emotion-eliciting situation in a way that changes its emotional 
impact” (2004, p. 1304).  Unlike response-based strategies such as sup-
pression, cognitive reappraisal comes early in the emotion-generation se-
quence and infl uences whether or not particular emotion response tenden-
cies are triggered in the fi rst place.  When utilizing antecedent strategies 
the agent is not fi ghting an emotion that has already been triggered and 
trying to keep that emotion from leading to correlated behaviors.  Rather 
the agent employs strategies that can prevent the onset of negative emo-
tions (or emotions that might lead to unwanted behaviors).
Several examples from recent research illuminate the nature and ben-
efi ts of antecedent-focused strategies such as cognitive reappraisal.  For 
instance, Jeffrey M. Schwartz’s (1999) research on cognitive-behavioral 
OCD therapy is an example of a long-term antecedent-focused strategy 
that includes cognitive reappraisal as well as other of Gross’s antecedent-
focused strategies.  Schwartz and other researchers discovered that OCD 
stems from malfunctioning neural circuitry in the brain, but because of the 
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brain’s neuroplasticity, the agent can correct this malfunctioning neural 
circuitry.  To facilitate this neural change, Schwartz developed a four-step 
cognitive-behavioral method (1999, p. 122).  The fi rst step is for the agent 
to relabel the obsessive thoughts by recognizing that those thoughts and 
urges are a result of OCD.  The second step is to “reattribute” by realizing 
that the intensity and intrusiveness of the thought or urge is caused by a 
chemical imbalance in the brain that causes the OCD.  The third step is to 
“refocus” by turning one’s attention to something else besides the obses-
sive thoughts by for instance performing another behavior.  The last step 
is to “revalue” the thoughts and tell oneself that the thoughts the OCD 
cause should not be taken at face value and are not signifi cant.  Numer-
ous patients who engaged in this nine-week program experienced both 
objective and subjective change.  They reported signifi cant reduction in 
their OCD behavior and their brain activity was signifi cantly different. 
Schwartz notes that “What this accomplishes is a change in perspective 
away from automatic responses (exactly the sort of activity the basal gan-
glia is wired by many millennia of evolution to perform)… and toward a 
more precise, considered, and consciously goal-directed interpretation of 
the present moment’s experience—which is, of course, a much more corti-
cally directed activity” (1999, p. 127).  Extended regulation strategies can 
change neural activity, the generation of emotions and impulses, and the 
associated behaviors.
4. Some Concluding Remarks 
When comparing the two Socratic models of self-comportment—self-
mastery and harmony—with these two views of emotion regulation—ex-
pressive suppression and cognitive reappraisal—a number of interesting 
elements emerge.  Consider the similarities between the Socratic self-
mastery model and the response-based suppression strategy.  Gross notes 
that one very old and pervasive view of the emotions is that they are “[i]
rrational forces that unleash destructive thoughts and impulses…”  (2004, 
p. 1306).  Socrates’ self-mastery model adopts a similar view, seeing emo-
tions and appetites as strong infl uences that must be mastered or else they 
hinder the agent’s ability to be virtuous.  Socrates presents the different 
parts of the soul (which correlate nicely with parts of the brain—the pre-
frontal cortex and the limbic system/amygdala) as constantly in confl ict 
with each other and that the emotions “set themselves up as rulers in us 
when they ought to be ruled” (606d).  Emotions and appetites constantly 
bombard the agent with urges that confl ict with the agent’s true, rational 
nature, and must be battled and mastered.  The logistikon must continu-
ally subdue the epithumetikon for the well-being of the soul, draining the 
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agent’s cognitive energy and producing a sense of inauthenticity in the 
agent.  Gross makes the former point about energy when comparing the 
suppression and reappraisal models.  He notes, “[p]hysiologically, partici-
pants who suppressed showed signs of greater physiological activation (in 
cardiovascular and electrodermal systems) than participants who simply 
watched (or reappraised)” (2004, p. 1306).  Not only is the struggle con-
stant, but also the strategy takes more energy in addition to other negative 
repercussions.  Gross remarks “reappraisal decreased both the experience 
and the behavioral expression of negative emotion without any increase in 
physiological activation” (2004, p. 1306).  In other words, whereas agents 
who suppressed their emotions managed to decrease the associated behav-
iors, they still subjectively experienced the emotion and expended more 
energy in the process.  Agents who reappraise not only decrease both the 
associated behavior and subjective experience of the emotion, but also 
spend less energy doing so.
Another consequential difference between the two strategies appears 
in the research.  Individuals who chronically use suppression “are keenly 
aware of their lack of authenticity, and they admit to deceiving others about 
their true inner feelings, attitudes, and beliefs.  They do so, they report, 
because they are concerned about not being accepted by others…” (2004, 
p. 1313)  Gross defi nes authenticity as the “extent to which individuals 
behave in ways that are congruent with their own inner feelings, attitudes, 
and beliefs, rather than engaging in knowingly false self-presentations” 
(2004, p. 1313).  Furthermore “…suppression was related to inauthenticity 
but reappraisal was not” (2004, p. 1313).  Regularly utilizing suppression 
methods leaves the agent keenly aware of the discrepancy between his/
her inner feelings and outward expression.  In Socratic terms, suppression 
creates disharmony in the soul.  When describing the harmony model of 
self-comportment, Socrates states that the just person “doesn’t let each 
part in him mind other people’s business or the three classes in the soul 
meddle with each other, but really sets his own house in good order and 
rules himself.  He arranges himself, becomes his own friend, and harmo-
nizes the three parts, exactly like three notes in a harmonic scale, lowest, 
highest and middle” (443d).  The just person’s soul is in harmony with 
itself.  The different aspects of the self do not struggle for dominance; the 
logistikon makes the fi nal call, but the other aspects are emphasized when 
appropriate.  Sometimes an emotional response is appropriate to the situa-
tion, sometimes not.  In those moments the logistikon needs to employ an 
antecedent-focused strategy such as reappraisal to keep itself from battling 
itself, to retain authentic integrity.
One fi nal point of comparison: surely Socrates would not have spent 
135
Socratic Harmony and Psychological Authenticity
so much time explaining the self-mastery model if he thought it was only 
negative.  Gross (2004, p. 1312) observes that most people utilize both 
response-based and antecedent-based strategies; indeed, it seems to fol-
low from his research that both are necessary for psychological and social 
well-being.  They are not mutually exclusive.  Socrates knew that both 
strategies were necessary and not exclusive.  However, someone who en-
gages primarily in response-based strategies will be depleted of important 
cognitive resources and energy and will have a deep sense of inauthentic-
ity.  Long before this contemporary research, Socrates was aware of the 
range of emotional experiences and the necessity of different strategies for 
different experiences and situations.  Furthermore, Socrates seemed quite 
aware that what we now call Expressive Suppression as the primary mode 
of emotional regulation was detrimental to a productive sense of self; that 
is why he offers the harmony model as a check against the self- mastery 
model as the primary mode of virtue cultivation.
Notes
1 By Socrates, we mean the character in the Platonic dialogues, not the his-
torical Socrates.  Whether or not Plato espoused the views that Socrates articu-
lates is a deeply vexed question and one we will not address here.
2 This may not be the case for someone who has spent much time in medi-
tation and contemplation (like a monk for instance), but these were all “average 
Joes” who would almost inevitably be affected by the subject matter.
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